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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of the transition from a planned to
a market economy on living standards and welfare in the five
Republics of former Soviet Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, along with the Republic
of Azerbaijan. A broad definition of welfare is taken and the
indicators of well-being discussed are not limited to standard
economic measures of poverty based on incomes or expenditures,
but also include trends in selected capability-based indicators –
reflecting the health and education of the population and the
extent to which the social sectors are faring under increasing
marketisation; demographic-based measures – reflecting individual
and household expectations and perceptions about the future; and
socio-environmental indicators – reflecting the social environment
within which people live.
The picture that emerges is of a regional population facing
severe economic, physical and psycho-social stress. Over half the
population is now living in poverty. Real wages have fallen,
joblessness has increased, school enrolment has dropped and
general health has deteriorated. In addition to exacerbating the
disadvantage of the ‘old poor’ – pensioners, families with large
numbers of children and single parent families – the economic
dislocation of transition has also given rise to new groups of poor,
including the families of workers ‘on leave without pay’, the long-
term unemployed, agricultural workers, young people in search of
their first job, and a growing number of refugees, both economic
refugees and persons displaced as a result of civil conflict.
However, despite this gloomy picture, households are also
proving to be remarkably resilient to the dramatic drop in living
standards most have experienced. Poor households throughout
the CARs are surviving through a variety of coping mechanisms
including the sale of assets, increased home production of food,
expanding informal sector activities, borrowing from relatives or
friends and, particularly in the case of Tajikistan, humanitarian
aid. Many of these strategies are not sustainable in the longer term.
A strategy for alleviating poverty and encouraging regeneration
therefore needs to be put in place. Such a strategy should be three-
pronged and should: increase employment opportunities; improve
the social safety net; and protect the region’s human capital.
11. Introduction
1.1 The inheritance
The five Central Asian Republics (CARs) – Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – along with
their neighbour Azerbaijan cover 4,041,000 square kilometres, an
area roughly equivalent to that of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh
combined. In contrast, however, the CARs together have a total
population of just 64 million people, compared with the 1.1 billion
people living in the countries of South Asia. The republics vary in
size, geography and natural resources – ranging from the small
mountain states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, dominated by the
Tien Shan and Pamir mountains, through to desert state of
Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan is the most populous Republic in the
region with 21 million inhabitants, whilst Kazakhstan is the
largest, covering an area five times the size of France. However,
despite the great heterogeneity amongst the CARs, they share a
common Soviet inheritance that sets them apart from other
countries in South and West Asia.
Table 1: Human Development Indicators in Central Asia and
selected other countries, 1991
Urban
pop. (%)
in 1992
Popl.
growth
(p.a.)
Life
expectancy at
birth (yrs)
Adult
literacy
rate (%)
Real GDP
per capita
(PPP$)
UNDP Human
Development
Index
Armenia 72.0 98.8 4610 0.801
Azerbaijan 54 1.8 71.0 96.3 3670 0.730
Kazakhstan 58 1.8 69.0 97.5 4490 0.774
Kyrgyzstan 38 2.3 68.0 97.0 3683 0.685
Tajikistan 31 3.1 70.0 96.7 2180 0.629
Turkmenistan 45 2.8 66.0 97.7 3540 0.697
Uzbekistan 40 2.9 69.0 97.2 2790 0.664
Afghanistan 19 1.8 42.9 31.6  700 0.208
Iran 58 3.3 66.6 56.0 4670 0.672
Pakistan 33 2.9 58.3 36.4 1970 0.393
Turkey 64 2.4 66.7 81.9 4840 0.739
Medium HDI - - 68.0 80.4 3420 0.649
Low HDI - - 55.8 47.4 1170 0.355
Source: Table 1.1 Falkingham et al (1997) with additional data for Armenia
and Azerbaijan from UNDP Human Development Report 1994.
2Table 1 shows various indicators of development on the eve
of independence for the five Central Asian Republics, Azerbaijan
and for several other neighbouring countries. The table
demonstrates the legacy of economic and social development
during the Soviet period, whilst highlighting the new Republics’
Asian dimension.
Despite a relatively low level of real GDP, all the CARs have
a Human Development Index of above 0.6 – placing them firmly in
the group of countries with a medium level of development. Life
expectancy at birth averages around 68 years, which is
significantly above that enjoyed in Pakistan and exceeds levels in
Iran and Turkey. Literacy is almost universal and well above other
countries with comparable levels of per capita income.
In other respects, however, the CARs exhibit characteristics
common to other Asian countries; characteristics that are typically
associated with a lower level of development. In general levels of
urbanisation are low. The urban population exceeds 50% of the
total only in Kazakhstan (with a similar level of urbanisation to
that in Iran) whereas in Tajikistan over two-thirds of the
population continue to live in rural areas (as in neighbouring
Pakistan). Conversely, rates of population growth remain high –
the result of continuing high fertility combined with low mortality.
À On the eve of independence most human development
indicators for the Central Asian Republics were much higher
than for those in bordering countries or with comparable
levels of income.
À However some of the demographic characteristics of the
CARs remained more typical of their Asian neighbours than
of their former Soviet comrades.
1.2 Developments since 1991
As we have seen, at independence all of the newly formed Central
Asian Republics inherited high levels of human capital. Education
and health care were free and there were extensive social services
and transfers. The CARs also, however, inherited economic
structures that were heavily dependent on Soviet supply and trade
networks. Russia was the main source of inputs and the main
market for outputs. Transport and other infrastructure was
designed with the view to meeting these needs and not necessarily
those of the local economy. High social spending was supported
3by large budgetary transfers from Moscow. It is estimated that in
the late 1980s/early 1990s such transfers were worth between 12
percent of GDP (in Kazakhstan) to as much as 40 percent of GDP
(in Tajikistan).
The withdrawal of subsidies from Moscow following
independence combined with the interruption of inter-republican
trade within the former USSR and the impact of tight government
stabilisation policies resulted in a dramatic reduction in output
across the region. Azerbaijan faced a number of additional external
shocks which exacerbated the situation, including the conflict with
Armenia and the added disruption to trade due to the Chechen
conflict, whilst Tajikistan was hit by prolonged internal civil
conflict and several severe natural disasters.
1.2.1 Output
Figure 1 shows the annual change in real GDP over the last seven
years1. Growth was negative in all countries in the region up to
1995, since when there has been a gradual reversal of fortunes
(with the exception of Turkmenistan, which experienced a 25%
drop in GDP in 1997 alone). Positive growth is forecast in all
Republics for 1998 (EBRD, 1998). However despite recent
improvements, as Table 2 shows, real output remains significantly
below pre-transition levels.
Not only has the decline in real GDP in the CARs been
greater than elsewhere, but the duration of depression has also
been longer. Most of the transition countries in Eastern Europe
and the Baltics experienced three to four years negative growth in
GDP (Milanovic, 1998), whereas GDP decreased for six successive
years in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (1989-1995) and at least seven
in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Continuous negative economic
growth has a considerable deleterious impact on both current
living standards and confidence in, and perceptions of, long-term
well-being.
                                                
 
1
 There are considerable problems in compiling a consistent series of
data on economic performance across time, both due to changes in
definition and variation in data quality. Absolute numbers should
perhaps be treated with caution. However, the overall trends are clear.
4Table 2: Selected Macro-economic Indicators in Central Asia
since independence
Real GDP
(Index 1991=100)
Price inflation
(% change in end
year consumer
prices)
Real wages
(Index 1991=100)
Registered
unemployment
1993 1997 1993 1997 1994 1996 1993 1997
Azerbaijan 60 46 1294 1 22.1 14.3 1 0.7 1.1 2
Kazakhstan 87 67 2169 11 32.9 34.4 0.6 4.2
Kyrgyzstan 68 64 1363 15 59.4 44.5 0.2 3.2
Tajikistan 63 42 7344 165 5.0 3 1.2 2.9
Turkmenistan 85 44 9750 22 3.0 1
Uzbekistan 87 86 885 28 0.3 0.5
Notes: 1 1995; 2 1996; 3 estimate in Mills (1998)
Source: EBRD, Transition Report Update (1998)
The pace of transition has not been consistent across the
region and this is reflected in the trends in indicators in Table 2
and Table A1. Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan all
experienced early price liberalisation with subsequent runaway
inflation. Inflation peaked in Kyrgyzstan in 1992-3 (at around 800
Figure 1: Change in real GDP 1991-1998 (1991=100)
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5percent), and in Azerbaijan (at 1,600 percent) and Kazakhstan (at
1,900 percent) in 1994. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan
have been slower reformers. Prices were liberalised later, and
inflation peaked later too.
Liberalisation of prices and wages is only one, albeit a key,
dimension of transition. The share of the private sector in GDP is a
good indicator of ‘progress’ in both large and small-scale
privatisation. Again the picture is mixed. In 1997, only 20% of GDP
was attributable to the private sector in Tajikistan, compared to
25% in Turkmenistan, 40% in Azerbaijan, 45% in Uzbekistan, 55%
in Kazakhstan and 60% in Kyrgyzstan (Table 2.1, EBRD, 1997).
There is considerable debate as to whether gradual reformers
suffer less economic and social disruption than more rapidly
liberalising transition economies (see Griffin, 1998; Pomfret and
Anderson, 1997). Is a fast or slow transition ‘better’ in terms of its
impact on welfare? It is difficult to tell in Central Asia context.
Tajikistan, a slow reformer, has suffered the greatest drop in
output whereas Uzbekistan, another slow reformer, has managed
to avoid many of the large shocks associated with transition
elsewhere in the region2. Tajikistan, along with Azerbaijan has,
however, also been affected by civil conflict for much of period,
muddying the picture. Whilst not the central theme of this chapter,
it may be useful to bear in mind the differential pace of transition
in each of the Republics when, in the subsequent sections, we
examine the trends in welfare indicators during transition.
1.2.2 Real wages
The most significant factor affecting living standards in the region
has been the dramatic reduction in output. However, of almost
equal importance has been the decline in the value of real wages.
A consistent time series is only available for three of the CARs, but
in all cases the drop in real wages has exceed the decline in output –
illustrating the fact that labour has been the least well protected
factor of production during transition.
Unemployment, the experience of which is central to the
well-being of those individuals and households affected, has also
risen significantly. The labour market was initially slow to adapt
and in the early 1990s registered unemployment remained low in
                                                
 
2 The welfare impact of slow transition in Uzbekistan has been usefully
examined by Pomfret and Anderson (1997).
6all countries. However since 1994 it has increased considerably
despite the return to positive growth in several countries. The
figures on registered unemployment represent only a fraction of
real unemployment. Open unemployment is estimated to range
from as much as 30 percent in Tajikistan (World Bank, 1998a), 20
percent in Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan (EBRD, 1998) , 11 percent
for men and 6 percent for women in Uzbekistan (Coudouel, 1998),
to around 6 percent in Kazakhstan (World Bank, 1998b).
1.2.3 Social spending
The ability of governments to respond to depressed economic
activity by simply increasing public expenditure has been severely
constrained by the loss of Union budget transfers, the erosion of
the tax base associated with declining output and the growth in
informal sector economic activity. In fact, the fall in GDP has been
accompanied by a growing incapacity of governments throughout
the region to mobilise resources. Tax collection rates reached a low
of about 16% of GDP in Azerbaijan in 1996 (World Bank, 1997a).
Other countries have not fared much better with the share of tax
revenues to GDP being below 13% in Kazakhstan in 1997 (EBRD,
1997). As a result government expenditures as a share of GDP
have fallen sharply.
Table 3: Selected indicators of change in social spending over
time
Govt. expenditure
as % GDP
Expenditure on
social protection as
% GDP
Expenditure on
Education as %
GDP
Expenditure on
Health as % GDP
1991 1996 1991 1996 1991 1996 1991 1995
Azerbaijan 46.3 1 18.8 5.4 6.5 3.5 3.5 1.4
Kazakhstan 32.9 18.5 11.21 6.6 7.6 3.2 4.3 2.9
Kyrgyzstan 30.3 23.3 0.9 1 8.0 2 5.4 3.6 3.3
Tajikistan 49.6 17.9 1.4 1.6 9.1 3 1.8 4.5 1.1 4
Turkmenistan 38.2 15.7 3.3 3.2 1.5
Uzbekistan 52.7 36.2 10.2 1 7.4 5 4.6 3.5
Notes: 1 1992; 2 1990; 3 1993; 4 1996; 5 1995.
Sources: Chellaraj et al (1997); EBRD (1998); UNICEF (1998); World Bank
(1996).
Between 1991 and 1996 government expenditures as a share
of GDP in Tajikistan fell by nearly two-thirds from 50 percent to
7under 18 percent. Elsewhere proportionate declines have ranged
from two-fifths in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to around a fifth
in Kyrgyzstan (Table 3).
The collapse in GDP combined with lower government
spending has meant that real allocations to the social sectors have
declined precipitously. Table 4 shows that public expenditures on
education and health are running at about a quarter to a third of
pre-independence levels in real terms in all Republics except
Uzbekistan. Real spending on social protection has also fallen –
levels in Azerbaijan in 1996 were only 17 percent of that in 1992,
whilst in Kazakhstan they were 40 percent.
Table 4: Trends in real expenditure on education and health care
Real expenditure on
education
Real expenditure on
health care
1991 1996 1990 1993 1995
Azerbaijan 100 1 24 100 67 18
Kazakhstan 100 28 100 58 35
Kyrgyzstan 100 2 38 100 40 36
Tajikistan 100 54
Turkmenistan 100 47 30
Uzbekistan 100 1 67 3 100 77 72
Notes: 1 1992; 2 1990; 3 1995.
Sources: Chellaraj et al (1997); World Bank (1996); UNDP (1997).
What are the consequences of these falls in output, wages
and social expenditures for the welfare of the population? Below
we go on to look at changes in the level, composition and
distribution of incomes and what that has meant in terms of the
number of persons and households living in poverty.
À There has been a dramatic reduction in output across the
region.
À In 1997 real GDP was still below half its pre-transition level
in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan and a third
below In Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
À Real wages have declined even further than real output and
open unemployment is as high as 30 percent in Tajikistan,
and 10-20 percent elsewhere.
8À The fall in GDP has been accompanied by a growing
incapacity of governments throughout the region to mobilise
resources.
À Real allocations to the social sectors have declined sharply to
about a quarter to a third of pre-independence levels.
À The pace of transition has been different across the different
countries in the region with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan
experiencing the fastest reform, Azerbaijan a middle
position, and Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan being
much slower.
À Azerbaijan and Tajikistan have also suffered from the
additional shock of civil conflict, with the impact being
particularly pronounced in Tajikistan.
2. Income and Inequality during transition
Declines in income have been seen to be the most decisive factor
influencing poverty (Milanovic, 1998). This is especially true when
the declines are of such a magnitude as those shown in Table 2.
Even at the lowest point of the Great Depression of the 1930s, GDP
in the USA did not fall to below three-quarters of its pre-
depression level3, whereas in several CARs it has more than
halved. Accompanying the decline in output has been a change in
the distribution of income and this is also an important dimension
of welfare.
2.1 The distribution of income pre transition
In the Soviet Union the overall distribution of income was much
more egalitarian than in most market economies (Atkinson and
Micklewright, 1992; Milanovic, 1998). This was due to both the
higher level of social expenditure – social transfers made up 14
percent of total gross income (USSR, 1988 Family Budget Survey) –
and lower wage differentials4. Over 96 percent of the work-force
                                                
 
3 In 1933, four years after the Wall Street Crash, real GDP in the USA
was around 75% of its 1927 level. This was the low point of the
depression and after 1933 positive growth was resumed (Milanovic,
1998).
 
4 It is generally agreed that rates of return to education in the Soviet
Union were less than in market economies and consequently the
9were employed by state-owned enterprises (including kolkhozes).
Thus, virtually all income, either transfers or wages, was received
through the intermediation of the State.
Table 5: Summary statistics for individual distribution of
monthly per capita gross household income for workers and
collective farm workers within the Soviet Union by Republic,
1989
Mean per capita
income
 Mean relative
to
RSFSR
P90/P10 1 Gini coeff 2
Russia 178.65 100 3.16 0.278
Lithuania 201.93 113 3.11 0.278
Latvia 198.72 111 3.08 0.274
Estonia 219.18 123 3.31 0.299
Ukraine 153.35 86 2.76 0.235
Belarus 170.29 95 2.73 0.238
Moldova 141.33 79 3.08 0.258
Georgia 150.15 84 3.53 0.292
Armenia 134.85 75 3.14 0.259
Azerbaijan 110.33 62 0.328
Kazakhstan 142.92 80 3.46 0.289
Kyrgyzstan 104.06 58 0.287
Tajikistan 82.94 46 0.308
Turkmenistan 102.26 57 0.307
Uzbekistan 91.29 51 0.304
ALL USSR 158.83 89 3.53 0.289
Notes: 1 P90/P10 is the ratio of the ninetieth percentile in the distribution to
the tenth and gives an indication of the level of income enjoyed by the ‘better-
off’ relative to the ‘worse-off’. 2 The Gini coefficient is a summary measure of
inequality. 0.00 implies perfect equality where every observation has the same
income; 1.00 perfect inequality. where the last observation has all the income.
Source: Table UI3, Atkinson and Micklewright (1992).
Table 5 gives us some idea of the distribution of income
within the different Republics prior to independence. Note that it
is based on data from the old Family Budget Survey5 and limited
                                                                                                                        
difference between non-manual and manual workers was lower than
in the West (Rutkowski, 1995).
 
5 The limitations of the Family Budget Survey have been detailed
elsewhere (for example see Falkingham and Micklewright, 1997). The
main criticism has been that the surveys were not nationally
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to workers and collective farm workers and their families. The
distribution of income in the CARs was somewhat more unequal
that elsewhere in the Union with Gini coefficients of over 0.3 in
several Republics. Average per capita income across the region
was also considerably lower than in Russia – varying from under
half in Tajikistan to 80 percent in Kazakhstan. In part, this
difference is explained by the higher fertility and larger average
household size of the CARs pulling down average household
income when measured on a per capita basis (with the exception
of the more ‘european’ Kazakhstan), but there is no doubt that the
CARs were also amongst the poorest republics in the Union
(Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992).
2.2 Changes in income and inequality during transition
What happened to the distribution of income (and expenditure)
following independence? Table 6 summarises some of the
available data. Columns (1) and (2) are comparable with the same
measures in Table 5. Both are for per capita gross income and both
rely on the old format family budget surveys, although data for
the later period are not limited to workers and agricultural
workers.
The Gini coefficient has increased in all four of the Republics
for which there are data: from 0.289 to 0.327 in Kazakhstan, 0.287 –
0.353 in Kyrgyzstan; 0.307 – 0.358 in Turkmenistan; and 0.304 –
0.333 in Uzbekistan. This shows a considerable growth in income
inequality over just four years. The fastest increase was in
Kyrgyzstan, where the coefficient increased by 0.017 per annum –
a rate two and a half times as fast as that recorded in the fastest
inequality-increasing Western countries in the 1980s, one of which
was the UK whose income Gini coefficient increased from 0.302 in
1987 to 0.337 in 1991(Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995;
Atkinson, 1996).
                                                                                                                        
representative and the sample frame used tended to under-represent
both those at the bottom and top of the income distribution.
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Table 6: Summary statistics for the distribution of income and
expenditure – the 1990s
(1)
Gini coefficient of
gross per capita
income, 1993
(2)
P90/P10
1993
(3)
Gini coefficient from LSMS data
selected years
(HBS)
Per capita
income
Per capita expenditure
Azerbaijan n/a n/a 0.347 (1995)
Kazakhstan 0.327 4.50 0.350 (1996)
Kyrgyzstan 0.353 5.40 0.678 (1993)
0.511 (1996)
0.548 (1993)
0.461 (1996)
Tajikistan n/a n/a
Turkmenistan 0.358 4.56
Uzbekistan 0.333 4.79
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) are derived from Milanovic, 1998 and are based
on data from countries’ household budget survey. P90/P10 is interpolated
from the cumulative frequency distribution. Column (3) are from World Bank
(1995, 1997a, 1998b) and are derived from recent survey data.
There has also been a significant increase in the decile ratio.
Whereas in 1989, in Kazakhstan, the ninetieth decile enjoyed a per
capita income three and a half times that of the tenth, by 1993 the
relative difference had increased to four and a half times. Put the
other way round, in 1989 the ‘poor’ had a per capita income
around 30 percent of the ‘rich’. Four years later, it was just over 20
percent.
Since 1993, Living Standard Measurement Surveys have been
held in three of the Republics. Fieldwork has just been completed
in Turkmenistan and a survey is planned for Tajikistan in Spring
1999. The LSMS are nationally representative multi-purpose
surveys which collect detailed information on a range of topics,
including income, expenditure and consumption. They allow us to
construct a more complete picture of consumption than would
otherwise be the case, including consumption derived from home-
production and gifts. Column (3) in Table 6 presents the findings
from the LSMS held in the region to date. The newly available
survey data confirms that the greatest increase in inequality in the
early 1990s appears to have taken place in Kyrgyzstan – the fastest
reformer in the CAR. In fact the Gini coefficient for per capita
income from the LSMS was almost twice as high as that from the
HBS (0.678 compared 0.353).
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There are problems in collecting information on household
incomes at the best of times – with data subject to under-reporting,
particularly income from private and informal sector activity. In
Autumn 1993, when the first Kyrgyz LSMS was conducted, these
problems were exacerbated by the fact that significant sections of
the work-force were on leave without pay and others were owed
significant amounts in arrears. Per capita expenditure, therefore,
may provide a better measure of welfare as it is less prone to
under-reporting and fluctuation.
Using expenditure as the ‘welfare standard’ inequality still
appears to have significantly increased in Kyrgyzstan by 1993.
Since then there has been a slight reversal with the distribution of
expenditure becoming somewhat more equitable as the economy
entered into economic recovery. Nevertheless the Gini coefficient
of 0.461 in 1996 is still relatively high by international standards,
being akin to those experienced by Thailand (0.462) and Costa Rica
(0.461) (World Bank, 1997b).
Data for Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan show similar levels of
inequality in household expenditure, with a Gini coefficient of
around 0.350 – above that of India in 1992 (0.338). A number of
factors have contributed to the worsening of the income
distribution during transition.
The growth in inequality is directly related to changes in the
composition of income during transition. In the Soviet Union in the
late 1980s, only 14 percent of total gross income was from private
sources (including 7 percent from self-employment), whilst social
transfers comprised 13 percent, labour incomes 72 percent and
income from property was non-existent (Milanovic, 1998). By 1995,
in Azerbaijan secondary employment alone accounted for around
13 percent and income from other private sources amounted to
around 14 percent (World Bank, 1997a).
Accompanying the growth in income from private sources
has been a rise in levels of earnings inequality. The Gini coefficient
for the distribution of monthly earnings for Kyrgyzstan has
increased by two-thirds between 1989 and 1996, from 0.26 to 0.43
(UNICEF, 1997). Similarly, using data from the 1995 EUI survey in
Uzbekistan, Klugman (1988) found that the decile ratio for all
earnings had increased from 3.0 in 1986 to 6.50 in 1995, and that
decile the ratio for earnings in the state sector was 6.0 as compared
to a staggering 8.3 in the private sector. Earnings are predicted to
become even more dispersed as the market system allows rewards
13
to be more closely associated with risk taking, training, individual
talent and effort (EBRD, 1997).
Income inequality has been further exacerbated by the
emergence of open unemployment and the increasing inequality of
income from sources other than employment. The redistribution of
wealth and changes in property incomes that will accompany
privatisation is expected to further raise inequality over time.
Income inequality has increased during transition.
This is due to :
À Restructuring of economic activity and greater private sector
income;
À Change in wage distribution;
À Growth of open unemployment;
À Redistribution of wealth and privatisation of state assets.
À The rise in inequality has been most pronounced in
Kyrgyzstan – an early reformer, and least pronounced in
Uzbekistan – a slow reformer.
3. Poverty
There is a close relationship between income inequality and
poverty and a priori we would expect that as inequality rises so too
will poverty.
3.1 Dimensions of poverty
Poverty is a multidimensional phenomena and accordingly there
are a wide variety of approaches to its measurement. Poverty can
be objective or subjective, absolute or relative, temporary or
chronic.
Conventionally poverty has been defined in terms of income
or expenditure based on the assumption that a person’s material
standard of living largely determines their well-being. The poor
are then identified as those with a material standard of living
below a certain level – the so-called poverty line. Where this level
is set determines how many people are poor and how many are
non-poor and as such the derivation of the poverty line is almost
always a matter for debate and controversy.
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There are two main approaches to constructing a poverty
line. An absolute definition of poverty assumes it is possible to
define a minimum standard of living based on a person’s
physiological needs for water, clothing and shelter – i.e. their basic
needs. In contrast, the relative approach defines poverty in relation
to a generally accepted standard of living in a specific society at a
specific time and goes beyond basic physiological needs. It was
such a relative approach to poverty that was implicitly in the
‘socially acceptable minimum’ used to defined under-resourced
households in the former Soviet Union.
The absolute and relative approaches to defining poverty
each have advantages and disadvantages6. An advantage with the
absolute approach is that there are reasonably objective norms,
while with the relative approach the decisions concerning what is
an ‘acceptable’ minimum become much more subjective,
depending on how the norms of the particular society are
established. The absolute approach also has the advantage that
because it is explicitly linked to a specific welfare level, it allows
for comparisons over time or between different groups. The
absolute approach is not however without problems and there
remains the contentious issue of how the ‘basket of basic needs’ is
defined 7.
Increasingly, however, it is being recognised that material
resources, or rather lack thereof, reflect just one, albeit very
important, dimension of poverty. Monetary measures fail to
capture other important aspects of individual’s well-being such as
public goods, community resources, social relations, culture,
security and the natural environment. Recently McKinley (1997)
has proposed a system of complementary poverty measures which
focus on capability poverty, incorporating access to public services,
assets and employment, as well as income poverty, covering the
ability to ‘purchase’ food, clothing and shelter.
Capability poverty focuses on an individual’s capacity to live
a healthy life, free of avoidable morbidity, having adequately
nourishment, being informed and knowledgeable, being capable
                                                
 
6 There is an extensive literature on this. See for example Sen (1977),
Atkinson (1987, 1989) and Ravallion (1994).
 
7 See Lanjouw (1997) for a discussion of the poverty line in the Central
Asian context and Olsen Lanjouw (1997) for a more general discussion
on poverty lines per se.
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of reproduction, enjoying personal security, and being able to
freely and activity participate in society. Material resources at
some level are generally necessary for some of these activities but
they alone are not sufficient. Therefore capability poverty goes
beyond income poverty in terms of measuring actual well-being.
Moreover it is argued that the capability approaches puts the
emphasis on people as active agents, with abilities and capacities
in contrast to the income, or basic needs approach, which tends to
see them in a more passive role, in need of certain goods and
services (McKinley, 1997).
Capability poverty can be measured directly in terms of
capabilities themselves: e.g. the percentage of children who are
underweight or the percentage of adults who are illiterate; or
indirectly in terms of access to opportunities, or the means of
capabilities, such as access to clean water and sanitation, access to
trained health personal at birth, and access to other public services.
Below we discuss the available evidence on material poverty
– as measured by income and expenditure – before turning in
sections 4, 5 and 6 to other dimensions of poverty and well-being.
3.2 Trends in ‘material’ poverty
3.2.1  Poverty before transition
Poverty did not officially exist under the Soviet system, although
there were ‘maloobespechenny’ (or ‘under-provisioned’) families.
The concept of a subsistence minimum to determine who was
under-provisioned was not used. Instead a ‘minimum
consumption basket’ that reflected the socially acceptable minimum
for a community was applied8. In 1989 the national ‘social
minimum’ calculated by Goskomstat was around 81 rubles per
month.
Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) chose to take 75 rubles as
the national ‘poverty threshold’. Taking the Union as a whole, 31
million people, or 11 percent of the population, were estimated on
the basis of the Family Budget Survey to be poor by this standard
(Table 7). The proportion living in poverty however varied
considerably across the Republics, with over half of those living in
                                                
 
8
 This basket allowed for a generous level of consumption of both food
and non-food items and contained relatively high proportions of high
cost foods such as animal fat and meat .
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Tajikistan having a per capita income of less than 75 rubles
compared to just 2 percent in Estonia.
Table 7: Summary statistics for poverty within the Soviet Union
by Republic, 1989
Percent of republic population
with per capita monthly income
below 75 Rbs, 1989
Share of total persons in USSR with
per capita monthly income below 75
Rbs, 1989
Russia 5.0 23.3
Lithuania 2.3
Latvia 2.4 0.6
Estonia 1.9
Ukraine 6.0 9.8
Belarus 3.3 1.1
Moldova 11.8 1.6
Georgia 13.0 2.2
Armenia 14.3 1.5
Azerbaijan 33.6 7.5
Kazakhstan 15.5 8.1
Kyrgyzstan 32.9 4.5
Tajikistan 51.2 8.4
Turkmenistan 35.0 3.9
Uzbekistan 43.6 27.6
All USSR 11.0
Source: Table 8.4 and Figure 8.10 in Atkinson and Micklewright (1992).
Together the Central Asian republics contained just over half
of all the poor, whilst accounting for only 17 percent of the Soviet
population. Since households in Central Asia tend to be bigger
than in the European republics, per capita income may tend to
exaggerate differences in living standards between the republics.
At the same time differences in prices across the republics are
ignored by the single cut off measure of 75 roubles and prices were
higher, on average, in Central Asia than in many of the other
republics which would imply that living standards were
overestimated in the region (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992).
Whatever the case, it appears from Table 7 that it would be untrue
to say that poverty was unknown in Central Asia before the
transition.
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3.2.2 Poverty during transition
The transition to a market economy may not have originated
poverty in the CARs, but it exacerbated the existing problem for
the ‘old poor’ and gave rise to new groups of poor. Figure 2 shows
the current distribution of absolute poverty across the region,
measured as the share of the population living below a poverty
line of US$ 4 PPP per person per day9.
Applying the same poverty line of four international dollars
per capita per day at 1990 prices, Milanovic (1998) has used data
from the FBS to compare poverty before and after transition. Two
things stand out. First, poverty before transition is much lower
using this standard than was found to be the case using the Soviet
social minimum, as in Table 7. For example pre-independence
poverty in Uzbekistan is 44 percent by the Soviet minima and
‘only’ 24 percent using four international dollars. This is not
surprising as Milanovic’s poverty line is equivalent to only 54
rubles, over 20 rubles lower than the 75 ruble threshold used by
Atkinson and Micklewright. Secondly, Table 8 clearly
demonstrates that there have been significant increases in poverty
since transition with rates in the CARs around 50 percent, except
                                                
 
9
 The amount of $PPP 4 per capita per day is used by UNDP in the
Human Development Report (1997). This is a relatively high poverty
line. The World Bank definition of absolute poverty is $1 a day.
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in Kyrgyzstan where the headcount measure was ‘an
unrealistically high’ 84 percent (Milanovic, 1998).
Table 8: Estimated proportion poor 1987-88 and 1993-94 (poverty
line = $PPP 120 per capita per month at 1990 prices)
Percentage of population
in poverty
Total number of poor
(in millions)
1987-88 1993-94 1987-88 1993-94
Kazakhstan 5 50 0.8 8.5
Kyrgyzstan 12 84 0.5 3.8
Turkmenistan 12 57 0.4 2.2
Uzbekistan 24 47 4.8 10.0
Russia 2 43 2.2 64.2
Source: Table 5.2, Milanovic (1998).
We have already discussed the difficulties with both the FBS
and the dubious accuracy of data concerning income in Section 2
above. These problems take on particular significance with regard
to the measurement of poverty and a more reliable picture of the
present situation may be provided by analysis of the LSMS.
Results from these shown in Table 9 below.
The estimates in Table 9, based on per capita household
expenditures, are somewhat lower than those based on the FBS
data by Milanovic (shown in Table 8). This may be due to
problems in the measurement of income as well as the choice of
poverty line. In Azerbaijan, around three out of five households
were found to be living in poverty in 1995 (World Bank, 1997a)
and in Kazakhstan one in three individuals were poor (World
Bank, 1998).
Kyrgyzstan is the only country for which there is currently
data over time. The survey evidence clearly shows both an
increase in headcount poverty over time, from 40 percent in 1993
to 61 percent in 1996 and a worsening distribution of poverty
among the poor. This is somewhat surprising as we saw that
inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, fell over the same
period. Poverty and inequality do not necessarily have to move
hand in hand but they usually do. It may be that the quality of
data collection improved over time, with a concomitant reduction
in the number of extreme observations.
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Table 9: Poverty indicators in the Central Asia Republics
Poverty
rate
(% poor)
Poverty
gap
Poverty
indicator
Gini
coefficient
Azerbaijan (1995 ASLC) 1
  households
  individuals
61.5
68.1
24.31
27.6
12.6
14.4
0.347
Kazakhstan (1996 KLSS) 2
  households
  individuals 34.6 11.4 5.2
0.35
Kyrgyzstan (Spring 1996 KMPS) 3
  households
  individuals
                     (1993 KMPS) 3
  households
  individuals
60.5
68.7
39.7
45.4
31.4
36.8
19.5
22.7
20.6
24.5
12.6
14.9
0.46
0.58
Notes: 1 Welfare indicator: household food expenditures fall below the value
of the food poverty line; 2 Welfare indicator: per capita household
consumption. Poverty line: Government’s subsistence minimum
(prozhitochnyi minimum); 3 Using the ‘high cost’ poverty line and total
household expenditure as welfare indicator.
Sources: Coudouel, 1998; World Bank, 1995, 1997a, 1998b; Mimeo: Kyrgyzstan
Analysis Report, Spring 1996 LSMS.
Elsewhere in the region poverty is also widespread.
Uzbekistan appears to be in the most favourable position with
overall incidence of poverty at ‘only’ 30 percent in 1995, estimated
from a household survey conducted by the European University
Institute (Coudouel, 1998). The 1996 UNDP Report for
Turkmenistan estimates that over half the population are now
poor. There is no reliable evidence of the extent and depth of
poverty in Tajikistan, although a recent survey carried out by
ECHO in August 1997 found one in every six households to be
‘food insecure’ (Freckleton, 1997). It is estimated that as many as 85
percent of the population of 6 million could be considered poor,
and of these 700,000 (12 %) are extremely poor and a further
300,000 (or 5 % of the population) are ‘helplessly destitute’ (Mills,
1998). The situation in Tajikistan is therefore urgent.
A critical question if poverty is to be reduced is which groups in
society are most at risk of being or becoming poor.
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À Prior to independence the CARs were amongst the poorest
republics in the Union.
À Since independence poverty has risen significantly.
À Poverty rates are around
- 30 percent in Uzbekistan
- 35 percent in Kazakhstan
- 50 percent in Turkmenistan
- 60-70 percent in Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan
- over 80 percent in Tajikistan.
3.3 Who are the poor? Trends in social inequality: vulnerable
groups
In the past, ‘under-provisioned’ families were typically portrayed
as pensioners living alone, single parent families or families with
large numbers of children (Braithwaite, 1995). Atkinson and
Micklewright also found that poverty was higher amongst
collective farm households, although this may be the result of
understatement of income from private plots.
A detailed socio-economic profile of the poor is available in
the three countries for which LSMS data is available. In addition
data from the EUI survey can be used to obtain a picture of the
poor in Uzbekistan.
3.3.1 Family and Household structure
Poor households are generally larger than non-poor households.
In Kazakhstan households in the bottom quintile of the
consumption distribution have an average of 4.5 members
compared to slightly less than 3 in the top quintile. In Azerbaijan
very poor families have an average of 5.7 people, against 4.1
people for the non-poor. Similarly in Kyrgyzstan the average size
of poor households was 5.4 compared to 4.7 for all households
(World Bank, 1995, 1997a, 1998).
However, the relationship between poverty and household
size is not straightforward. It would be expected that an increase
in the number of adults would tend to reduce the risk of
household poverty since the number of adults should affect the
earnings potential of the household. This is indeed found to be the
case in Kyrgyzstan with individuals from households with 3-4
adults having lower relative poverty rates than individuals with
only two adults, no matter how many children are also present in
the household (Ackland and Falkingham, 1997).
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Therefore, it is households with a large number of children
(rather than people) that are most at risk of poverty. In Azerbaijan,
very poor households contained twice as many children as non-
poor households, whilst in Kazakhstan those households in the
bottom quintile had, on average, two-thirds more children than
those at the top. Families with young children were
disproportionately represented in the lower quintiles, with over 40
percent of bottom quintile households having small children
compared to less than a quarter of all households (World Bank,
1998).
Surprisingly, pensioners in general were not found to face a
significantly higher risk of poverty. In fact, in Kyrgyzstan in both
1993 and 1996 it was found the pensioner-headed households in
urban areas actually faced a lower risk of poverty than other
groups. On the face of it therefore it appears that pensions may be
acting as a protective factor helping to keep older people out of
poverty. However, we should be careful about drawing
conclusions from this, as pensioners are not a homogeneous
group. Pensioners who live alone and those who have no other
source of income other than their pension were found to face a
much greater risk of poverty than others (Ackland and
Falkingham, 1997).
3.3.2 Rural or Urban poverty
Poverty is higher in rural areas in all countries with data.
According to the Kazakhstan LSMS 30 percent of the urban
population is poor whilst the figure for rural areas in 39 percent. In
Kyrgyzstan rural households were over 1.6 times more likely to be
living in poverty than urban households.
Residence in urban areas outside the capital was also found
to be significant in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (Coudouel et
al 1997).
While poverty in urban areas is generally lower than in rural
areas, one group of urban dwellers are generally believed to be
poorer than most. These are residents of one-company towns where
the entire labour force was dependent on one or a few enterprises
during Soviet times and which have since closed. These
communities face particular difficulties as local unemployment
rates are extremely high, those still working are often subject to
short hours or administrative leave and the prospects for
alternative work are bleak.
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3.3.3 Poverty and Education
In theory one would expect an association between a household’s
ability to avoid poverty and its asset holdings – including it’s
human capital. In studies elsewhere, it is common to find a strong
correlation between level of education and poverty. The survey
data in Kyrgyzstan do point to some association with education.
However, it is not linear – with those experiencing the greatest risk
of poverty having secondary education relative to higher
education or just primary education (Ackland and Falkingham,
1997). This relationship is also found in Uzbekistan (Coudouel,
1998). In Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan education and poverty are
inversely correlated but the association is relatively weak. This
may reflect both recent economic dislocation with all groups being
hit regardless of education, and perverse incentives in the labour
market to human capital acquisition. Under the Soviet system
many of the best educated (such as teachers and professional
workers) had very low paying jobs. It may be that recently
acquired university education will result in greater returns than
before.
Employment was also found not to be a guarantee against
poverty, although the results in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan do
suggest that having a job is better than being unemployed or not in
the labour force at all. The low differentials in poverty rates
between workers and the unemployed indicate substantial wage
arrears and large numbers on workers on unpaid leave or short
time. They may also, however, be indicative of under-reporting of
wage income and the growing role of informal sector activities in
protecting living standards. Nevertheless, it does appear to be the
case that in all countries there is now a substantial group of
‘working poor’.
3.3.4 Poverty and Gender
At first glance, the gender of the household head was not found to
be significantly correlated with poverty in any of the CARs.
However, there are a number of compounding factors that may be
obscuring the picture. Firstly, female headed households tended to
be smaller and older than other households, factors associated
with a lower risk of poverty. Also, female-headship may be acting
as a proxy for region. In rural areas, which have higher poverty,
the head would typically be a man. Once we control for these
factors, a difference picture emerges. In Kyrgyzstan female headed
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households in urban areas were much more likely to be poor than
the average.
Survey data reveal other gender inequalities. Results from
the Azerbaijan LSMS show significant gender disparities in wages
between men and women. This is not a new phenomenon as
gender wage differentials in the Soviet period were around 30
percent (i.e. women earned 70 % of male earnings) (Ofer and
Vinokur, 1992). However, it appears that these differentials have
not only persisted after independence, but have actually widened.
Although the results do not control for the number of hours
worked, women earned on average around 40 percent of the
wages of men (World Bank, 1997a). In Kazakhstan in 1996, official
wages in the female-dominated sectors (education, health care)
were about half the official average wage (World Bank, 1998).
Women also appear to have suffered a sharper fall in labour force
participation than men (Klugman and Scott, 1997). Men, however,
have borne the cost of transition in other ways, particularly with
regard to mortality, which we discuss below.
The characteristics associated with low household welfare in the
CARs are:
À large family size, especially those with a high number of
children
À living in a rural area or outside the capital
À one-company towns
À secondary level of education (relative to primary or
university)
À unemployment and periods of unpaid leave.
4. Other dimensions of well-being – changes in
capability-based indicators
It has sometimes been argued that estimates of output in transition
economies are unreliable and that the declines in income and rises
in poverty are exaggerated (Griffin, 1998). It is useful, from this
point alone, to look at other types of evidence concerning other
dimensions of poverty to get a fuller picture of the changes in
welfare during transition. Examining trends in capability-based
indicators relating to the health and education of the population
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also allows us to directly assess the consequences of transition for
human development.
4.1 Health in Central Asia
4.1.1 Mortality
The negative impact of the transition process on the health of the
population of Central Asian is clear across a number of morbidity
and mortality indicators. The most fundamental measure of the
well-being of a population is how long its members can expect to
live on average.
Figure 3 shows that life expectancy at birth fell between 1991
and 1995 in all of the republics. The deterioration in life expectancy
was greater amongst the fast reformers and higher among men
rather than women, with the exception of Tajikistan where the
country has been are affected by armed conflict for much of the
period. Over a four year time period, Kazak male life expectancy
fell by 3.6 years to 59.7 in 1995. This compares to a fall of 2.5 years
for Kazak women, to a life expectancy in 1995 of 70.4 years. Similar
patterns are evident for Kyrgyzstan, and there is a large gender
differential in Azerbaijan. These patterns are consistent with
evidence for Russia and Central and Eastern Europe (McKee,
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1998), although the falls in male life expectancy have not been as
great as those experienced in Russia.
There is some evidence that life expectancy has now begun
to recover in those countries where figures are available. Life
expectancy for men in Kyrgyzstan in 1996 was 62.3 compared to
61.4 a year earlier.
Table 10: Trends in infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 25.3 25.5 28.2 25.2 23.3
Kazakhstan 27.4 26.1 28.4 27.2 27.3 25.4
Kyrgyzstan 29.7 31.5 31.9 29.1 28.1 25.9
Tajikistan 40.6 45.9 47.0 40.6 30.9 31.8
Turkmenistan 47.0 43.6 45.9 46.4 42.2
Uzbekistan 35.5 37.4 32.0 28.2 26.0 24.2
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0; UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children
1998 (1998)
The negative trends in life expectancy are, in part, related to
changes in infant mortality. The trends in infant mortality
presented in Table 10 show that nearly all the Central Asian
republics, and Azerbaijan, experienced sharp rises between 1991
and 1993, and then improvements between 1993 and 1996.
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have the highest infant mortality
rates among the republics, with 42.2 (1995) and 31.8 (1996)
respectively10.
Changes in reporting practices, such as the failure to report
births and deaths of infants in the first weeks of life, may mask
more dramatic changes. Becker, Hemley and Urzhumova (1996)
investigated the trends in Kazakhstan and suggested that infant
mortality rates were underestimated in the mid 1990s due to under
reporting. This may also be the case elsewhere in the CARs.
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 Recent figures indicate that the infant mortality rate has risen
particularly sharply in Tajikistan, reaching a level of 53.4 per 1,000 live
births in 1997 (Mills, 1998). These rates reflect the impact of the civil
conflict and in particular poor maternal health, poor nutrition, poor
sanitary conditions, infectious diseases, a lack of pharmaceuticals, low
quality medical care, and fragmented health services regionally.
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Uzbekistan experienced a slight worsening between 1991-92,
from 35.5 to 37.4, but since then infant mortality rates have
improved, reaching 24.2 in 1996. Once more, we see Uzbekistan
occupying a better position relative to the other republics on the
‘transition welfare hierarchy’ of prosperity and disadvantage. This
improvement may be associated with the marked rise in
contraceptive use; a rise which has resulted in fewer births, longer
spacing between births and a lower birth rate among women over
thirty-five (UNDP, 1996)11.
Indices of women’s health in the CARs are, on average,
significantly worse than in developed countries, although they
have followed diverse paths from each other during economic
transition. Maternal mortality rates (MMR) are particularly high in
Tajikistan, at 74.0 per 100,000 live births (1993), Kazakhstan,
52.9/100,000. (1996), Azerbaijan 44.1/100,000 (1996) and
Turkmenistan 44.4/100,000 (1993). This compares to an average
MMR of under 10 in most countries of the European Union. Prior
to independence, rates in Kyrgyzstan were of a similar magnitude
to her neighbours, 55.6/100,000 in 1991, but since then rates have
improved to 31.5 in 1996. This is almost certainly a direct result of
a new reproductive health programme. Maternal mortality has
also fallen significantly in Uzbekistan (from 30.1 in 1992 to 18.9 in
1995), again largely the result of increased contraceptive use and
better reproductive health.
4.1.2 Health status
Evidence on morbidity, rather than mortality, is limited and most
of the available data relates to the incidence of particular diseases.
There is no consistent series across the region on chronic
morbidity, self-reported general health status or importantly
during the stress of a transition period, psychological well-being
(although trends in suicides do give some indication of extreme
psychological stress).
The last six years have witnessed a growth in incidence of
diseases related to poverty and economic disadvantage. The
unusually high incidence of tuberculosis in Azerbaijan,
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in Table 11 and Table A.3(b) reflects
the extent of the plight of the poor. TB rates peaked in 1993 in
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 Contraceptive use increased from 12% of women of child-bearing age
in 1990, to 21% in 1991, 33% in 1993, to 38% in 1995 (UNDP, 1996).
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Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, but have continued to rise in
Kyrgyzstan reflecting a deepening of poverty. Mortality rates by
respiratory diseases for children under five (Table A.3(h)) also rose
between 1991 and 1993. Since then child cause-specific death rates
have recovered, but standardised death rates from this cause
continued to rise (Table A.3(i)).
Table 11: Changes the incidence of Tuberculosis and Syphilis in
Central Asia since independence (new cases per 100,000
population)
Tuberculosis Syphilis
1991 1996 % change
1991-96
1991 1996 % change
1991-96
Azerbaijan 37.5 49.7 +33% 4.0 7.8 2 + 195% 2
Kazakhstan 64.4 82.3 + 28% 2.1 231 +11,000%
Kyrgyzstan 56.9 87.2 +53% 2.1 137 +6,524%
Tajikistan 38.4 1.6 12 +750%
Turkmenistan 61.2 42.1 1 -31% 1 5.4 28 +518%
Uzbekistan 45.8 43.5 1 -5% 1 1.9 24 +1,263%
Notes: 1 1995; 2 1993.
Source: Renton and Borisenko (1998).
There has been a spectacular increase in the reported
incidence of syphilis and gonorrhoea in a number of countries
(Renton and Borisenko, 1998). In Kazakhstan new cases of syphilis
have increased 100-fold since 1991. These trends are a stark
reflection of the multiplicity of economic and social shocks
experienced in the region. The rise of sexually transmitted diseases
is particularly worrying as the incidence of HIV/AIDs has been
found to follow the trends in STDs in other countries.
4.1.3 Health care services
A number of indicators of the level of health care services such as
the number of hospital beds per 1,000 population, have fallen in
the Central Asian republics between 1991-1995 This is not,
however, necessarily an indicator of declining access to services.
Prior to independence, the Soviet style health care system was
characterised by widespread access, combined with inefficient use
of resources – reflected by long inpatient stays, a high number of
hospital beds and, by international standards, a high ratio of
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medical staff to patients. Independence has brought about a shift
from in-patient care to day care or out-patient activities, which
have reduced costs and improved efficiency levels.
However, it is not clear whether the quality of the health care
received by people themselves has improved or worsened. It is
clear that routine child immunisation fell in early years of
independence in some of the CARs. For example, in Kazakhstan
the proportion of children immunised against measles fell from
93.7% in 1989 to 72.0% in 1994/5 whilst in Uzbekistan they
decreased from 80.9% to 71.0% across the same period. In
Tajikistan the DPT immunisation rate of children under 2 years
(against diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus) fell from 87.9 in 1989 to
82.0 in 1993. However immunisation rates rose elsewhere in the
region.
There is some evidence that access to health care is being
affected by the increase in private (informal) payments for health
care. Abel-Smith and Falkingham (1995) found that one in four
persons incurred a charge for a medical consultation in
Kyrgyzstan. State-sector facilities charging for supposedly free
services is also a common practice in Uzbekistan (Pomfret and
Anderson, 1997). By far the most significant item of private
medical expenditure is on drugs and medical supplies. Real
government expenditure on pharmaceuticals has declined
dramatically across the region, leaving low income households
vulnerable. Abel-Smith and Falkingham (1995) estimated that, in
Autumn 1994 for all households, except those in the top quintile of
the income distribution, the average costs associated with an
inpatient stay exceeded the average total monthly income of the
household. Thus one episode of poor health by one member can
put a household under severe financial stress. Similarly Lubin
(1995) reported that surgery in good clinics in Uzbekistan in 1993
cost over a tenth of average annual salary.
À Health status has deteriorated in some of the CARs –
particularly Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, whilst
elsewhere there have been improvements Uzbekistan.
À Life expectancy fell between 1991 and 1995 in all countries
and the fall has been greater for men than women.
À Infant mortality also worsened up to 1993. Since then there
has been improvement in all countries except Tajikistan
where it has continued to rise sharply.
29
À Maternal mortality rates are particularly high in Tajikistan,
at 74.0 per 1000,000 births (1993), 52.9 (1996) in Kazakhstan,
44.4 (1993) in Turkmenistan, and 44.1 (1996) in Azerbaijan.
À The last six years have witnessed a growth in incidence of
diseases related to poverty and economic disadvantage –
such as tuberculosis in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan (the early reformers).
À There has been a dramatic rise in STDs, with worrying
consequences for HIV/AIDs.
À There is evidence of access to health care is being affected by
the growth in private (informal) payments for health care.
State-sector facilities charging for supposedly free services
becoming commonplace and patients are often expected to
buy the necessary drugs and medical supplies. The higher
the cost of health the greater the barrier to access.
4.2 Education and human capital
As we saw in Table 1, the countries of the FSU, including Central
Asia, began the transition with near-universal literacy and the
work-force included significant numbers of highly trained
scientific, technical, medical and other professional specialists.
Although many of the teaching methods and curriculum might
have been questionable by today’s western standards there is no
doubt that the level of human capital was significantly higher than
elsewhere in the region.
Tables 3 and 4 in Section One highlighted the drop in
government expenditure on both education and health services.
These falls in real spending are in turn reflected in the changes in
enrolment rates presented below. The trends shown in Table 12
indicate that several of the countries of Central Asia have suffered
serious reversals in education between 1991 and 1996.
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Table 12: Changes in school enrolment rates (% of the relevant
age group) in Central Asia since independence
Pre-primary enrolment
rate
Basic education
1991 1996 % change
1991-96
1991 1996 % change
1991-96
Azerbaijan 20.6 13.8 -33% 91.2 86.7 1 -5% 1
Kazakhstan 52.5 23.5 1 -55% 1 92.7 90.0 -3%
Kyrgyzstan 26.7 8.0 -70% 84.5 76.4 -10%
Tajikistan 14.0 9.4 2 -33% 2 94.2 86.4 2 -8% 2
Turkmenistan 32.8 30.1 2 -8% 2 89.5 89.1 2
Uzbekistan 35.1 24.0 -32% 87.9 88.6 2 +1% 2
General secondary Tertiary
1991 1996 % change
1991-96
1991 1996 % change
1991-96
Azerbaijan 34.5 28.1 -19% 9.2 11.0 1 +20% 1
Kazakhstan 32.3 24.8 -23% 13.4 12.9 -4%
Kyrgyzstan 36.7 27.3 1 -26% 1 10.4 12.9 +24%
Tajikistan 37.7 22.3 -41% 9.4 9.4
Turkmenistan 37.5 35.6 2 -5% 2 7.9 7.3 1 -8% 1
Uzbekistan 36.5 27.0 -26% 9.4 5.0 -47%
Notes: 1 1995; 2 1994.
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0; UNICEF (1998), The State of the World’s
Children 1998.
The most worrying negative trend is the marked decline in
the proportion of children enrolled in pre-primary school (Figure
4). Prior to independence attendance at kindergarten was
widespread. About one half of children in the target age group
were enrolled at kindergartens in Kazakhstan, around a third in
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and a quarter in Kyrgyzstan.
Enrolment was lowest in Tajikistan at less than one sixth. Since
then rates have fallen dramatically in both Kyrgyzstan (down by
70%) and Kazakhstan (down 55%). This is in part due to the
closure of enterprise based (employer-provided) kindergartens.
However enrolments have fallen by more than the drop in
capacity suggesting a fall in demand for kindergarten places as
well as their supply (Klugman et al, 1997).
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Declining enrolment in kindergartens in Central Asia is of
particular concern given the role that kindergartens can play in
raising household welfare, both in terms of freeing the parent to
participate in other activities, specifically paid employment, and
the developmental role of pre-school education and nutritional
and health interventions (Klugman et al, 1997).
Primary education continues to be compulsory, and
enrolment rates have remained high, although they have declined
from the near universal levels of the Soviet era. In Kyrgyzstan
enrolment in primary schools fell by a worrying 10 percent
between 1991 and 1996. Furthermore, enrolment rates tell only
part of the story. There is a growing problem of declining school
attendance. In the past school children were routinely mobilised to
help with the harvest, but evidence from Azerbaijan shows that
today’s absences are qualitatively different from the past, with
some regions reporting more than 40% of children taking extended
absences from their studies or staying away from school
altogether. In part this is due to increased child labour, particularly
in rural areas. However the poverty of families has also become a
barrier to school attendance. The meaning of ‘free’ education has
shifted. The real costs of education faced by families have risen as
the cost of textbooks, supplies, meals and transportation are
increasingly being passed onto the student, with the result that
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Figure 4: Kindergarten enrolment rate, 1991-1996
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Source: UNICEF (1998)
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many poor parents can no longer afford to send their children to
school.
The drop in general secondary education enrolment is
particularly disquieting. There have been substantial declines
across the region with enrolment rates down by 40 percent in
Tajikistan and by a quarter to a fifth elsewhere (except in
Turkmenistan). In contrast there has been significant growth in
higher education in both Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan. In
Kyrgyzstan, where both primary and secondary enrolment is
declining eight new universities and over two dozen colleges have
been established. Virtually all of the growth in tertiary education
has been in the private sector with a proliferation of private
colleges in fields that were under-represented in the past – most
notably business studies, economics and law.
With rising costs at both school and college it is difficult to
resist the conclusion put forward in a recent UNDP report that the
education systems in Central Asia are coming to reflect the
increasing social stratification these societies. It is imperative that
the growing poverty and stratification outlined in Sections 2 and 3
do not result in the re-emergence of illiteracy and the cycle of
deprivation and social exclusion that accompany it.
À The countries of Central Asia have suffered serious reversals
in basic education between 1991 and 1996
À There has been a marked decline in the proportion of
children enrolled in pre- school, primary schools and general
secondary schools.
À The poverty of families is becoming a barrier to school
attendance. The real costs of education have risen as the cost
of textbooks, supplies, meals and transportation are
increasingly being passed onto the student. Many poor
parents can no longer afford to send their children to school.
5. Demographic indicators
Trends in life expectancy and mortality have already been
examined in the context of the health of the population. However,
trends in the patterns of family formation and dissolution have
historically been found to provide a good barometer of the level of
psycho-social stress in society. Malthus, writing as early as 1802,
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noted that as real wages fell, the level of marriages in society also
fell and this in turn was matched by a drop in fertility. Perceptions
about current and future changes in welfare can all affect
individuals’ decisions to marry, divorce and have children – with
increasing uncertainty reflected in falling marriage and birth rates.
Table 13: Selected Demographic Indicators in Central Asia since
independence
Crude birth rate  Total fertility rate
1991 1996 % change
1991-96
1991 1996 % change
1991-96
Azerbaijan 27.0 20.0 -30% 2.9 2.4 -17%
Kazakhstan 21.1 15.4 -27% 2.7 1 2.4 -11%
Kyrgyzstan 29.3 23.7 -19% 3.7 3.0 -19%
Tajikistan 38.9 22.0 -43% 5.0 4.0 -20%
Turkmenistan 33.6 24.0 -29% 4.1 3.7 -10%
Uzbekistan 34.5 27.3 -21% 4.2 1 3.6 -14%
Crude marriage rate  General divorce rate
1991 1996 % change
1991-96
1991 1996 % change
1991-96
Azerbaijan 10.4 5.2 -50% 14.4 14.5 +1%
Kazakhstan 9.9 6.2 -37% 29.5 39.5 +34%
Kyrgyzstan 10.6 5.7 -46% 19.0 25.1 +32%
Tajikistan 10.3 13.4 13.5 2 +1%
Turkmenistan 10.8 7.4 2 -31% 14.4 18.0 2 +25%
Uzbekistan 12.9 7.4 -40% 12.3 12.4 2 +1%
Notes: 1 1990; 2 1995.
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0; UNICEF (1998), The State of the World’s
Children 1998.
Table 13 and Figure 5 show trends over the last five years in
key indicators of family formation. In every country in the region
marriages have fallen dramatically, with the marriage rate halving
in Azerbaijan and falling by at least a third elsewhere. The fall in
births has been equally startling, with birth rates down by between
20 – 40% and the total period fertility rate (which take into account
changes in the size of the population of reproductive age) down by
between 10 – 20%.
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A number of explanations for this trends have been put
forward. The most straightforward is that the contraction in the
number of marriages and births shown in Table 13 is simply a
continuation of trends that were well underway before
independence. Certainly fertility in all countries in the region had
been decreasing steadily from the mid 1970s, with the total fertility
rate falling from 6.3 in Tajikistan in 1975/6 to 5.5 in 1985 and 5.0 in
1991, and from 5.7 to 4.6 and then to 4.4 in both Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan (Haub, 1994). However, the falls in births since
independence have been much sharper, over a shorter time period.
Moreover marriage in Central Asia was, until recently, virtually
universal. In 1990 of women aged 30-34 living in Kazakhstan only
7% were never married, and respective figures were even lower
elsewhere in the region – being 4% in Kyrgyzstan and 3% in
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Haub, 1994). Trends in
the crude marriage rate during the 1980s were, if anything,
upwards rather than downwards. Therefore it is fair to say that
recent trends do reflect a significant shift in demographic
behaviour. In fact, such changes in demographic indicators are
historically unprecedented outside areas affected by famine or
war.
Alternative explanations for the fall in fertility include the
rapid diffusion of ‘individualistic’ western values and
reproductive behaviour following the opening up of Central Asia
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to the West, combined with the erosion of pro-natalist measures
that were implicit in the Soviet system such as generous maternity
leave, extensive child care and child benefits. Certainly reductions
in, if not the complete elimination of, the latter has significantly
increased the private costs of childcare. However, Cornia and
Paniccia (1995, 1996) argue persuasively that recent trends in the
Eastern Europe and the European republics of the Former Soviet
Union are too marked to be explained by such theories and that
the dramatic demographic adjustment being experienced in those
countries is the direct response to economic shock.
Similarly, Haub argues that ‘the recent birth dearth ... is a direct
result of the collapse of the economy and a general lack of confidence in
the future’ (p.14, 1994). A detailed econometric investigation of the
type carried out for the European republics has yet to be
conducted for Central Asia but evidence from qualitative studies
offers supporting evidence for the view that the fall in the birth
rate is due to uncertainty and a lack of confidence in the future.
The rise in divorce rate is more difficult to explain. The
growth in divorce has been very modest in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan and most pronounced in the rapid reformers of
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. On the one hand it could be argued
that higher marital breakdown is a sign of increased stress on
familial relations, which in turn is related to the struggle to get by
on lower incomes, rising unemployment and the general economic
uncertainty . However in many instances it has been observed that
family breakdown rates actually fall during economic recession as
the family unit pulls together for survival (Fajth and Harwin,
1997). This makes the trends observed in Central Asia all the more
surprising. Higher divorce could also be associated with the
greater economic independence of women as market-created
opportunities increase.
Although macro-economic indicators show that the economies of
Central Asia have bottomed out and that positive economic
growth is forecast for all Republics in 1998, demographic indicators
highlight that the population still feels a high level of uncertainty
about the future.
À Birth rates fell by 20 – 40% between 1991-96
À The total fertility rate fell by 10 – 20%.
Marriage rates have decreased whilst divorce rates have risen.
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6. Trends in socio-environmental indicators
Finally, the social environment under which people conduct their
everyday life is also central to the physical and mental well-being.
Changes in the incidence of crime and increased threats to
personal security are a key dimension of this.
Crime rates in the FSU were historically low as strict controls
over the movement and activities of the population greatly
inhibited criminal behaviour (Fajth and Harwin, 1997). The lifting
of these restrictions along with the rapidly deteriorating economic
situation has lead to a rapid growth in criminal activity. Table 14
shows the trends in the reported crime and murder rate across the
CARs. Official data greatly under-estimate the true extent of crime
as only a fraction of crimes are actually reported.
Table 14: Crime and personal security indicators in Central Asia
during transition
(a) Reported crime rate (reported crimes per 100,000 pop.)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 217.7 309.0 247.5 251.0 268.1 234.1
Kazakhstan 1034.5 1188.4 1219.5 1205.6 1112.0 1117.0
Kyrgyzstan 725.3 985.2 955.0 926.9 915.0 869.2
Tajikistan 338.1 454.0 436.3 248.6 249.0 226.2
Turkmenistan 512.2 444.3 364.4 336.5 328.7 323.6
Uzbekistan 422.9 436.4 410.2 328.7 294.2 284.1
(b) Reported murder rate (reported murders per 100,000 pop.)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 5.6 9.0 7.5 7.6 6.2 5.7
Kazakhstan 10.3 12.3 15.3 15.2 14.8 15.9
Kyrgyzstan 8.3 10.5 12.3 12.3 11.9 11.4
Tajikistan 2.7 10.9 23.1 11.1 7.5
Turkmenistan 8.1 7.3 7.7 7.0 6.0
Uzbekistan 5.1 5.3 5.2 5.4 5.1
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0; UNICEF (1998).
Despite the difficulties in data and data collection, reported
crime rates have increased in virtually all the Republics, with the
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exception of Turkmenistan. Violent crime, has also increased. The
reported murder rate which acts as a proxy for violent crime, has
risen significantly in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan but has
been stable in Uzbekistan and actually fell in Turkmenistan. Note
that the low level of crime reported in Tajikistan should be treated
with scepticism12. It appears that in countries where reform has
proceeded fastest, crime has also risen fastest.
7.  Protecting the poor: the way forward?
The preceding sections have painted a bleak picture of falling real
incomes, growing poverty, declining life expectancy, deteriorating
educational status, greater family break-up and rising crime.
7.1 Current coping strategies amongst the poor
Poor households throughout the CARs are surviving through a
variety of coping mechanisms including increased home
production of food, expanding informal sector activities and,
particularly in the case of Tajikistan, humanitarian aid, as well as
payments from the formal safety net.
Howell (1994) classified these strategies into four main
groups:
(a) Reductive strategies – including reduced consumption, not
just of luxuries but also of basic items such as meat, sugar
and coal.
(b) Depleting strategies – through the sale of assets, particularly
livestock in rural areas but also household goods
(c) Maintaining strategies – by borrowing from relatives or
friends and raising credit from suppliers or producers
(d) Regenerative strategies – including trade and home
production of food and clothing for sale.
                                                
 
12
 The problem of security, or rather insecurity is particularly acute in
Tajikistan. The years of conflict have witnessed the emergence of
armed gangs and paramilitary groups with power bases built on illegal
trafficking and the systematic harassment of the civilian population –
inhibiting the ability of the poor to take advantage of new income
generating activities. In some areas people claim not to take produce to
market due to the bribes they will have to pay out at a series of so-
called check-points (Freckleton, 1997).
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Evidence on how households across the CARs are actually living
with poverty is sparse but what evidence exists points to
increasing use of reductive, depleting and maintaining strategies.
In Tajikistan, Freckleton (1997) found that two-thirds of
respondents claimed to have made changes to their diets over the
last few months, with 26 percent switching to cheaper foods, 12
percent smaller meals, 6 percent fewer meals and 19 percent
making a mix of changes. Information on the number of meals
eaten per day from the same survey reveals that 14 percent claim
to have reduced the number of meals they eat to fewer than three
during the last year and a worrying 7 percent have been eating
fewer than three meals for over 12 months. Looking forward for
the next 6 months, half of all households reported that they would
have to shift to cheaper foods to make end meet, a quarter would
sell household assets, and a fifth borrow money from others.
Abel-Smith and Falkingham (1995) as part of a study on
private payments for health care in Kyrgyzstan, found that 45
percent of rural households who had at least one member
experience an inpatient stay in hospital during the previous year
had sold livestock to raise the money to pay for that health care
(depletive) , 30 percent had borrowed money (reductive) while
only 15 percent sold produce (regenerative). Amongst urban
households, the most common strategy was to borrow money
(40%) and 15 percent had sold valuables.
All of these strategies, (a) – (c), are not sustainable in the
longer term. We are already seeing the impact of reductive
strategies reflected in worsening indicators of health status and
growing malnutrition. Urgent steps need to be taken to put in
place a strategy for alleviating poverty and encouraging
regeneration.
7.2 Towards a poverty reduction strategy
During the Soviet period there was a comprehensive welfare state,
based on the principles of social solidarity. Education and health
and other social services care were provided free and, with a
guarantee of full employment, unemployment was unknown. For
those unable to work there was an extensive system of invalidity
and old age benefits, and for families with young children there
were generous child benefits. Coverage of benefits was universal
and almost every household was eligible for at least one. In
addition to cash benefits there were numerous ‘benefits-in-kind’
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including free pre-school and child care, free or heavily subsidised
holiday camps, subsidised housing and utilities, free cultural and
sport facilities and generous maternity leaves. Many of these social
welfare benefits were delivered via the enterprise.
The economic and social dislocation associated with
transition has given rise to new groups of poor in need of social
cash transfers. However as we saw in Table 3 and 4 the ability of
governments to fund social protection has been severely curtailed.
Spending on health and education also adversely affected.
Although education and health care in principle remain free
(indeed free health care is enshrined in the constitution of several
of the CARs) delays in paying doctors, nurses and teachers have
given rise to widespread informal charges. Shortages of supplies
has meant that payments for drugs and textbooks have put even
these basic services beyond the means of the most impoverished
families.
Existing systems of assistance to the most vulnerable have
come under increasing pressure due to rising numbers of people in
need coinciding with tightening fiscal constraints. A new strategy is
needed.
7.2.1 Increasing employment opportunities
Just as the drop in output is the main engine behind the growth in
poverty, the key to reducing poverty is economic growth. Broad-
based growth will both increase wages for those in work and
create new employment opportunities. The prospects for growth
in Central Asia now look better than at any time this decade. In
1998 positive growth is predicted in all the CARs (EBRD, 1998) 13.
Some types of growth may be better at alleviating poverty
than others. Land reform and farm restructuring is needed to
stimulate employment-intensive economic growth and increase
the incomes of the rural poor. Labour-intensive public works
programme could raise the incomes of both urban and rural poor.
The establishment of credit unions and microfinance schemes that
encourage microenterprises would also do much to alleviate
poverty whilst accelerating growth, as could the promotion of
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
                                                
 
13
 See also appendix table A.1 which incorporates the latest EBRD
predictions on GDP growth and changes in consumer prices.
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Although economic growth and the concomitant increase in
employment is a necessary condition for reducing poverty, it is not
sufficient. For those who are unable to work, either through health,
disability or old age, or because sufficient jobs are not available, a
social safety net which provides an adequate level of income will be
critical.
7.2.2 Improving targeting
In Central Asia, it is not possible to maintain universal welfare
benefits at levels that can have a significant effect on poverty
alleviation. It is essential, therefore, to rationalise the existing system
of benefits and to establish an efficient and administratively feasible
strategy to identify and target the poor.
So far much of the debate in Central Asia has centred around
the means-testing what were formerly universal cash benefits. Little
attention has been paid to other forms of targeting or other forms of
benefit (although see Falkingham, 1997). There are, however, a
number of problems involved in introducing a means test based
upon income and/or wealth. Not least is the problem of verification
(Grosh, 1994). As privatisation continues, and the informal sector
grows in size, in the absence of taxation records it will increasingly
difficult to check wage income. Non wage income is even more
problematic in Central Asia with the additional mystery of the
private plot. Decisions have to be made on how to value home
produced goods, bartered food between neighbours and gifts from
friends and relatives.
Proxy means testing constitutes an attractive alternative to the
straight income test, particularly where income irregularities, in-
kind earnings or misrepresentation create major computational
problems – as is the case in Central Asia. Proxy means tests use a set
of characteristics which prove to be good predictors of poverty in
order to establish eligibility for a social program. Characteristics
might include whether land is available for cultivation, whether the
individual (or family) is physically able to cultivate the land, the
supply of water in the home as well as family structure, gender of
head of household, ownership of durable goods, occupation and
education. The availability of survey data makes such proxy means-
testing a realistic possibility. However, much more work is needed
on identifying the components of an index and the weights to attach
to each of these social indicators if we are to avoid problems of
exclusion and leakage.
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The high administrative costs associated with means-testing
has meant governments have often chosen to reduce the size of
benefits rather than limit the number of people eligible for them,
with the result that benefits are being paid at a level insufficient to
lift the most vulnerable out of poverty. In Uzbekistan an innovative
approach to targeting social assistance has been introduced which is
organised by the ‘Mahallah’ (local level committees of dignitaries).
Families in need of assistance submit an application to their local
Mahallah who after reviewing their financial situation determine the
amount of assistance received. The review includes both an income
and asset test, but the tests are conducted with marked flexibility
within well defined national guidelines (Coudouel, 1998). An
experiment along similar lines is now being implemented in Sissian
in Armenia. Another option which deserves greater attention in the
Central Asian context is the promotion of targeting through self-
targeting mechanisms such as public works, for the able bodied, or
soup kitchens.
Whatever the final choice of targeting mechanism it is
important that it is simple, administratively feasible and low cost.
Care must be taken to minimise work disincentives whilst ensuring
that benefits are paid at a level adequate to maintain a minimum
standard of living.
7.2.3 Protecting human capital
Finally, it is important that measures are put in place to protect the
human capital of society. Many of the trends discussed above have
indicated that transition has had negative consequences for human
development as countries begin to consume their human capital.
There is no doubt that both the education and health systems
are in need of structural reform. The health care system of the FSU
placed too high a reliance on curative rather than preventative
medicine and hospital rather than primary care. The education
system, in turn, produced too many narrow specialists, their
number determined by central planning and inertia rather than
demand. Both systems were inefficient.
During reform, however, it is essential to protect universal
access to basic social services for the poor. If fiscal expediency
makes it necessary to introduce charges for any of these services,
including tertiary education, then it is fundamental that these
charges are explicit rather than informal, and that they are
accompanied by targeted exemptions for low income families. This
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is important from a human development perspective and a human
rights. The long term development prospects of the country rest on
its human, intellectual and social capital
Towards a poverty reduction strategy
À Increasing employment opportunities through:
- Growth
- Land reform and farm restructuring
- Labour-intensive public works
- Credit unions and microfinance schemes
- Promotion of (SMEs).
À Improving the social safety net through:
- Rationalising existing systems of benefits
- Making better use of resources through targeting
Means-testing
Proxy means-testing
Self targeted programs
Community targeted programmes (such as the Mahallah)
À Protecting human capital
- Reforming health and education
- Removing barriers to access among the poor.
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Appendix Tables
Table A.1 Macro-economic indicators during transition
(a) Growth rate of GDP (constant prices, %)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1
Azerbaijan -1 -23 -23 -18 -11 1 5 7
Kazakhstan -13 -3 -10 -18 -9 1 2 3
Kyrgyzstan -5 -19 -16 -20 1 6 10 6
Tajikistan -7 -29 -11 -22 -13 -4 2 4
Turkmenistan -5 -5 -10 -19 -8 -8 -25 12
Uzbekistan -1 -11 -2 -4 -1 -1 2 2
(b) Real GDP (1991=100)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1
Azerbaijan 100 77 60 49 43 44 46 49
Kazakhstan 100 97 87 72 65 66 67 69
Kyrgyzstan 100 81 68 54 55 58 64 68
Tajikistan 100 71 63 50 43 41 42 44
Turkmenistan 100 95 85 69 64 58 44 49
Uzbekistan 100 89 87 83 82 84 86 88
(c) Percentage change in consumer prices (end year)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1
Azerbaijan 126 1395 1294 1788 85 7 1 5
Kazakhstan 137 2984 2169 1160 60 29 11 9
Kyrgyzstan 170 1259 1363 96 32 35 15 12
Tajikistan 204 1364 7344 2133 41 165 19
Turkmenistan 155 644 9750 1328 1262 446 22 50
Uzbekistan 169 910 885 1281 117 64 28 35
(d) Real wage index (1991=100)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 100.0 83.8 55.2 22.1 14.3
Kazakhstan 100.0 64.8 49.1 32.9 33.4 34.4
Kyrgyzstan 100.0 84.0 70.1 59.4 61.5 62.3
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(e) Registered unemployment rate
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1
Azerbaijan 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1
Kazakhstan 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.7 3.6 4.2
Kyrgyzstan 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.7 3.0 4.5 3.2
Tajikistan 0.3 1.2 1.7 2.0 2.6 2.9
Turkmenistan 2.0 3.0
Uzbekistan 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Notes: 1 1988 figures are projections, 1997 figures are estimates.
Source: (1998) EBRD Transition report update.
Table A.2 Demographic indicators in Central Asia during
transition
(a) Crude birth rate (per 1,000 pop.)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 27.0 25.2 24.2 21.4 19.4 20.0
Kazakhstan 21.1 20.0 18.7 18.3 16.7 15.4
Kyrgyzstan 29.3 28.8 26.2 24.8 26.2 23.7
Tajikistan 38.9 32.2 33.1 28.2 28.6 22.0
Turkmenistan 33.6 34.0 33.1 32.1 28.1 24.0
Uzbekistan 34.5 33.1 31.5 29.4 29.8 27.3
(b) Crude death rate (per 1,000 pop.)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 6.3 7.1 7.3 7.4 6.8 7.0
Kazakhstan 8.0 8.2 9.3 9.6 10.2 10.1
Kyrgyzstan 7.0 7.2 7.8 8.4 8.2 7.6
Tajikistan 6.1 6.6 8.8 7.0 5.9 5.1
Turkmenistan 7.3 7.1 7.9 6.9 7.0 8.0
Uzbekistan 6.2 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.4 6.2
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(c) Life expectancy at birth for men and women (years)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Azerbaijan 70.1 68.8 68.4 68.35 68.2 71.0
Kazakhstan 68.4 68.5 66.4 65.9 65.7 68.0
Kyrgyzstan 68.7 68.2 68.0
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan 69.0 68.6 67.0
Source: (Chellaraj et al, 1997; 1997 figures are from WHO 1998 World Health
Report, 1998)
(d) Male life expectancy at birth (years)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 66.3 65.4 65.2 65.2 63.4
Kazakhstan 63.3 63.0 61.8 60.6 59.7
Kyrgyzstan 64.6 64.2 62.9 61.6 61.4 62.3
Tajikistan 67.6 65.4 65.8
Turkmenistan 62.3 62.0
Uzbekistan 1 66.1 66.0
Note: 1 life expectancy at birth for both men and women fell from 69.0 in 1991
to 68.6 in 1992, and even further to 67.0 in 1997 (Chellaraj et al, 1997; WHO
World Health Report, 1998)
(e) Female life expectancy at birth (years)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 74.5 73.9 73.9 73.9 73.5
Kazakhstan 72.9 72.7 71.9 71.0 70.4
Kyrgyzstan 72.7 72.2 71.7 70.7 70.4 71.0
Tajikistan 73.2 71.1 65.7
Turkmenistan 69.3 69.0
Uzbekistan 1 72.4 72.0
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(f) Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 25.3 25.5 28.2 25.2 23.3
Kazakhstan 27.4 26.1 28.4 27.2 27.3 25.4
Kyrgyzstan 29.7 31.5 31.9 29.1 28.1 25.9
Tajikistan 40.6 45.9 47.0 40.6 30.9 31.8
Turkmenistan 47.0 43.6 45.9 46.4 42.2
Uzbekistan 35.5 37.4 32.0 28.2 26.0 24.2
(g) Total fertility rate
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.4
Kazakhstan 2. 7 1 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.4
Kyrgyzstan 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.1 3.3 3.0
Tajikistan 5.0 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.0
Turkmenistan 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.7
Uzbekistan 4.2 1 3.8 3.7 3.6
Note: 1 fertility rate for 1990.
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0; UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children
1998 (1998)
Table A.3 Health indicators in Central Asia during transition
(a) Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 10.5 17.6 34.4 43.8 37.0 44.1
Kazakhstan 48.0 57.0 49.6 48.3 57.4 52.9
Kyrgyzstan 55.6 49.9 44.5 42.7 44.3 31.5
Tajikistan 69.6 74.0
Turkmenistan 58.8 44.4
Uzbekistan 30.1 24.1 17.3 18.9
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(b) Tuberculosis incidence: (number of new TB cases per 100,000
pop.)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 37.5 37.5 40.3 38.2 40.1 49.7
Kazakhstan 64.4 64.6 61.7 59.7 67.1 82.3
Kyrgyzstan 56.9 57.9 54.5 59.7 72.9 87.2
Tajikistan 38.4 30.5 31.9 34.8 29.1
Turkmenistan 61.2 47.1 48.8 43.1 42.1
Uzbekistan 45.8 43.8 44.7 43.4 43.5
(c) Percentage of children under 2 years immunised against
diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 92.2 82.0 89.5 94.0 95.9 95.8
Kazakhstan 82.7 85.3 81.6 84.4 92.9 95.0
Kyrgyzstan 86.9 74.5 62.7 78.5 93.0 93.1
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan 80.0
Uzbekistan 84.1 83.2 49.2 65.2 86.1 95.0
(d) Rates of notification of new cases of Syphilis (per 100,000
pop.)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 4.0 6.0 7.8
Kazakhstan 2.1 3.5 8.2 33 123 231
Kyrgyzstan 2.1 2.5 4.4 22 33 137
Tajikistan 1.6 2.9 5.8 8.3 20 12
Turkmenistan 5.4 6.3 8.3 15 23 28
Uzbekistan 1.9 2.5 4.4 11 25 24
Source: Data for Table (e) from WHO Regional Office for Europe in Renton
and Borisenko (1998).
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(e) Mortality rate for children under 5 years (rates per 1,000 live
births)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1 1997 2
Azerbaijan 40.1 41.7 44.4 45.2 43.2 39.3 39.0
Kazakhstan 35.6 34.2 38.1 36.2 38.4 35.2 39.0
Kyrgyzstan 38.6 42.2 44.6 41.9 41.3 36.4 46.0
Tajikistan 81.7 76.0
Turkmenistan 68.2 78.0
Uzbekistan 48.1 60.0 57.0
Note: 1 Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek figure for 1996 are from UNICEF, 1998; 2
figures for 1997 are from WHO World Health Report 1998.
Source: TransMONEE
(f) Hospital beds per 1,000 population
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 10.00 10.50 10.50 10.10 10.20
Kazakhstan 13.33 13.15 13.37 12.38 11.69
Kyrgyzstan 12.10 11.90 10.70 9.60
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan 11.60 11.40 11.70 11.50
Uzbekistan 10.90 10.80 9.40 8.80
Source: Table (j) Chellaraj, Heleniak and Staines (1997).
(g) Average length of hospital stay (number of days)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 17.6 18.0 17.9 17.9 17.7
Kazakhstan 16.0 16.3 16.3 16.8
Kyrgyzstan 14.9 15.3 15.3 15.4
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan 15.2 14.7 14.9 15.1
Uzbekistan 14.8 15.0 14.5 14.3
Source: Table (l) Chellaraj, Heleniak and Staines (1997).
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(h) Real government pharmaceutical expenditures in Central
Asia (index where 1990=100)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Azerbaijan 100 118.40 59.52 68.62 41.84 34.60
Kazakhstan 100 114.86 55.86 79.40 72.95 60.23
Kyrgyzstan 100 57.56 75.83 52.96 31.68 26.65
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan 100 33.94 45.92 17.35 73.30
Uzbekistan 100 78.53 41.72 39.06 40.46 74.65
Source: Table (m) Chellaraj, Heleniak and Staines (1997).
Source: Data in above tables are from the TransMONEE database 3.0, unless
otherwise stated.
Table A.4 Education in Central Asia during transition
(a) Pre-primary enrolment rate (% of relevant age group)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 20.6 18.8 18.7 16.6 15.1 13.8
Kazakhstan 52.5 45.3 39.8 29.3 23.5
Kyrgyzstan 26.7 23.3 13.4 8.8 7.7 8.0
Tajikistan 14.0 11.0 10.4 9.4
Turkmenistan 32.8 32.0 39.6 30.1
Uzbekistan 35.1 30.7 29.0 26.1 24.5 24.0
(b) Basic education enrolment rate (% of relevant age group)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 91.2 92.8 92.9 90.6 86.7
Kazakhstan 92.7 91.7 91.5 90.9 90.5 90.0
Kyrgyzstan 84.5 83.9 83.6 83.0 82.5 76.4
Tajikistan 94.2 89.6 85.1 86.4
Turkmenistan 89.5 88.5 88.5 89.1
Uzbekistan 87.9 87.5 87.9 88.6
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(c) General secondary enrolment rate (% of relevant age group)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 34.5 32.8 28.9 27.0 25.8 28.1
Kazakhstan 32.3 31.0 28.4 27.0 25.5 24.8
Kyrgyzstan 36.7 36.0 32.5 28.6 27.3
Tajikistan 37.7 29.7 26.8 25.3 23.6 22.3
Turkmenistan 37.5 34.9 35.2 35.6
Uzbekistan 36.5 31.0 28.0 28.0 27.8 27.0
(d) Tertiary enrolment rate (% of relevant age group)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Azerbaijan 9.2 8.6 8.5 8.7 11.0
Kazakhstan 13.4 13.1 12.7 12.6 12.5 12.9
Kyrgyzstan 10.4 9.7 9.7 10.8 11.8 12.9
Tajikistan 9.4 9.3 8.6 9.2 9.4
Turkmenistan 7.9 7.4 7.4 7.3
Uzbekistan 9.4 8.7 7.4 6.3 5.4 5.0
Source: Data in above tables are from the TransMONEE database 3.0, unless
otherwise stated.
